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ARTICLE
Justice Rabinowitz and Personal
Freedom: Evolving a Constitutional
Framework
SUSAN ORLANSKY*
JEFFREY M. FELDMAN**
This Article honors the contributions former Chief Justice Jay
Rabinowitz has made to Alaskan jurisprudence in the areas of in-
dividual privacy and freedom of expression.  It begins by tracing
the development of the Alaska Supreme Court’s protection of in-
dividual rights above and beyond that provided by the federal
courts.  The Article then provides a thorough analysis of two deci-
sions authored by Justice Rabinowitz, Breese v. Smith and Ravin
v. State, which have laid the foundation for heightened protection
of privacy and freedom of expression rights in Alaska.  Next, the
Article discusses the influence and application of these two cases
on other privacy and freedom of expression cases, family law
cases, and criminal law cases.  The Article concludes that Justice
Rabinowitz’s seminal and far-reaching decisions have contributed
and will continue to contribute to the protection of individual con-
stitutional rights so treasured in Alaska.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Alaska has a longstanding tradition of respect for individual-
ity.  Many of the early settlers and those who traveled north to ex-
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plore for gold were on the run from various forms of trouble, mis-
conduct, and misfortune.1  Others simply found the fabric of life in
the developed cities and communities of nineteenth century
America too constricting, and sought refuge at the edge of the
frontier.2  The community values of territorial Alaska evolved to
reflect a high level of tolerance for personal idiosyncrasy, uncon-
ventional thought and lifestyle, and respect for personal privacy,
later to be known as the “right to be left alone.”3
Early decisions by territorial judges reflected the value Alas-
kans place on individual liberty.4  But the territorial cases were few
and their legal analyses were controlled by legal precedent devel-
oped by “outside” federal judges, who were influenced and guided
by a different culture.5  After Alaska achieved statehood in 1959,
the burden of melding traditional Alaskan values of personal free-
dom into a theory of constitutional law fell to the newly created
state judicial system.  In the ensuing four decades, the Alaska Su-
preme Court has played an important role in fostering tolerance
both for individual freedom of expression and the individual right
to be left alone.  The court has developed a body of law that pro-
vides a strong foundation for constitutional protection of these
traditional Alaskan values.
As a member of the Alaska Supreme Court for thirty-one
years,6 Justice Jay Rabinowitz participated in dozens of decisions
defining the contours of individual freedom in this state.  Two
opinions he authored early in his tenure form the foundation for
much of the state’s jurisprudence on free expression and privacy.7
These seminal decisions had significant influence far beyond the
expected realm of civil liberties’ decisions.  This Article examines
1. See, e.g., Mary C. Mangusso & Stephen W. Haycox, Introduction to
INTERPRETING ALASKA’S HISTORY: AN ANTHOLOGY 5 (Mary C. Mangusso &
Stephen W. Haycox eds. 1989).
2. See id.
3. Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 83 (Alaska 1980).
4. See, e.g., Glover v. Retail Clerk’s Union Local 1392, 10 Alaska 274 (D.
Alaska 1942) (recognizing free speech right in labor picketing); Smith v. Suratt, 7
Alaska 416 (D. Alaska 1926) (declining to restrain independent entrepreneur
from taking photographs of a polar expedition).
5. Prior to the recognition of Alaska statehood, appeals from the trial courts
in territorial Alaska were heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit in San Francisco.
6. Justice Rabinowitz was appointed to the Alaska superior court in 1960 by
Governor Bill Egan.  In February 1965, he was appointed to the Alaska Supreme
Court by Governor Egan, where he served until his retirement in 1996.  During
his tenure on the court, he served four terms as Chief Justice.
7. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d
159 (Alaska 1972).
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Justice Rabinowitz’s key decisions concerning individual rights and
some of the ways these decisions have shaped the case law in di-
verse areas such as students’ rights, election law, child custody and
divorce decisions, and the criminal law.  Part II of this Article pro-
vides the background to the Alaska Supreme Court’s protection of
personal freedom.  Parts III and IV discuss the two cases by Justice
Rabinowitz that have shaped protection for free expression and
privacy rights in Alaska.  Part V elaborates on Justice Rabinowitz’s
impact on the law of privacy and freedom of expression.  Parts VI
and VII explore the themes of privacy and free expression rights
developed by Justice Rabinowitz and the Alaska Supreme Court in
the areas of family law and criminal law.
II.  BACKGROUND: INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTION
The earliest decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court tended to
apply federal constitutional law to interpret the parallel provisions
of the state constitution.8  Justice Rabinowitz was a relatively new
member of the court in 1969 when the Alaska Supreme Court for-
mally began developing its doctrine of independent constitutional
analysis.  In Roberts v. State,9 the court for the first time explicitly
stated, “We are not bound in expounding the Alaska Constitu-
tion’s Declaration of Rights by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, past or future, which expound identical or closely
similar provisions of the United States Constitution.”10  The court
gave fuller expression to its right and obligation to interpret the
state constitution independently in Glasgow v. State,11 Baker v. City
of Fairbanks,12 and State v. Browder.13
8. See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 387 P.2d 933, 935 (Alaska 1964) (applying fed-
eral due process and equal protection standards to interpret state regulation); El-
lison v. State, 383 P.2d 716, 718-19 (Alaska 1963) (using federal cases to analyze
search and seizure issue); Knudsen v. City of Anchorage, 358 P.2d 375, 378-79
(Alaska 1960) (expressing the view that the Alaska courts were bound by the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment).
9. 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969).
10. Id. at 342.  In a case predating Justice Rabinowitz’s appointment to the
Alaska Supreme Court, the majority, in passing, expressed the view that the
Alaska court was not required to follow a U.S. Supreme Court decision.  See Mat-
thews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932, 937 (Alaska 1961); see also State v. Shelton, 368
P.2d 817, 819 (Alaska 1962) (questioning whether the Alaska court would follow
a U.S. Supreme Court decision on grand juries).
11. 469 P.2d 682, 686 & n.6 (Alaska 1970) (rejecting the restriction placed on
the court by the Knudsen decision).
12. 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (noting the recent recognition among
Alaska state courts of the power to interpret the state constitution independently,
provided that minimal national standards required by the U.S. Supreme Court are
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The court’s decisions in Roberts, Glasgow, Baker, and Brow-
der do not reveal explicitly why the court was moved to embark on
a theory of independent constitutional analysis at that particular
time, but it is likely that the court’s direction was responsive to
contemporaneous changes in the U.S. Supreme Court.  Roberts,
Glasgow, Baker, and Browder all were decided between 1968 and
1972.  During those years, the composition, balance, and judicial
philosophy of the U.S. Supreme Court changed dramatically with
the appointment by President Richard Nixon of four conservative
justices.14
As the reconstituted U.S. Supreme Court embarked on dis-
mantling the work of the Warren court,15 the Alaska Supreme
Court was left to act independently in its efforts to protect and fur-
ther develop the law of individual freedom.16  The court not only
                                                                                                                                
met).
13. 486 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1971).  Justice Rabinowitz authored this important
early decision declaring the independent authority of the Alaska Supreme Court.
In determining that an individual charged with criminal contempt was entitled to
a jury trial, not just a summary adjudication by the accusing judge, Justice Rabi-
nowitz recognized the duty of Alaska state courts to look beyond the guidance of
the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the state constitution: “[I]t would be an
abdication of our constitutional responsibilities to look only to the [U.S.] Su-
preme Court for guidance.”  Id. at 936-37.  The facts of Browder show clearly that
Justice Rabinowitz was guided solely by his understanding of constitutional prin-
ciples, uninfluenced by the politically unsympathetic nature of the claimant who
asserted those rights.  Browder was a member of the Brothers Motorcycle Club,
was described as heavyset, long-haired, and bearded, and entered the district
courtroom carrying a shotgun.  See id. at 928 & n.2.
14. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger was appointed in 1969; Justice Harry A.
Blackmun was appointed in 1970; and Justice (later, Chief Justice) William H.
Rehnquist and Justice Lewis F. Powell were appointed in 1972.
15. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (limiting prior cases on right
to counsel and holding that no right attaches at pre-indictment line-up); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (declining to apply strict scrutiny to classification
based on poverty); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (allowing impeach-
ment of defendant using statements obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wad-
mond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (finding no violation of due process or First Amend-
ment in requiring applicants for admission to state bar association to affirm loy-
alty to the United States and its form of government); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971) (upholding requirement that welfare recipients must submit to war-
rantless entry into homes as condition of receiving welfare); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (finding no violation of equal protection in establishing
maximum Aid to Families with Dependent Children grant, regardless of family
size).
16. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protec-
tion of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495-502 (1977) (commenting on
the then-recent trend of U.S. Supreme Court cases away from protection of indi-
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accepted this challenge, it embraced it.  Ultimately, the success of
the Alaska Supreme Court’s efforts was the product of three inter-
secting factors: the philosophical foundation of the strong Alaskan
tradition of respect for individual freedom; the explicit acknowl-
edgment of a right to privacy incorporated in the Alaska Constitu-
tion17; and the leadership provided by Justice Rabinowitz.18
III.  BREESE V. SMITH: THE FIRST ALASKA SUPREME COURT
DECISION ON FREE EXPRESSION
By 1972, the Alaska Supreme Court’s philosophical independ-
ence from the U.S. Supreme Court was well established, but un-
tested regarding the state’s Article I, section 1 constitutional guar-
antee of individual liberty in the realm of free expression.19  In
Breese v. Smith,20 Justice Rabinowitz authored the first Alaska Su-
preme Court opinion on this topic.
Michael Breese was a seventh grade student at a public junior
high school in Fairbanks, Alaska. Michael’s hair violated a school
regulation, which required that male students’ hair not be over the
ears, eyes, or collar.  The principal directed Michael to cut his hair,
and when, supported by his father, Michael refused to get a hair-
cut, the school district expelled him for willful disobedience of the
hair regulation.21  The Breeses sought injunctive relief, contending
                                                                                                                                
vidual rights and the increasing tendency of state courts to expand rights based on
state constitutions).  As an example of state court cases expanding individual
rights, Justice Brennan cited the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in Baker,
where the Alaska court expanded the right to jury trial beyond that guaranteed
by the federal constitution.  See id. at 500 n.74.
17. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22, adopted by initiative in 1972.
18. A fourth factor, the expansion of the Alaska Supreme Court from three
justices to five, is related to the impact of Justice Rabinowitz’s leadership.  The
early Alaska Supreme Court, appointed by Governor William Egan after state-
hood, was dominated by Chief Justice Buell A. Nesbett.  The Chief Justice was
considerably senior to Justice Rabinowitz when Rabinowitz first joined the court
at the age of 37.  In this setting, as a member of a small court with a strong Chief
Justice, it took time for the young Justice Rabinowitz to find his true voice.  The
subsequent retirement of Chief Justice Nesbett and the expansion of the supreme
court to five members, both in 1970, created a fertile environment for Justice
Rabinowitz’s intellectual and jurisprudential leadership.
19. Article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution provides
This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons have a
natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment
of the rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and enti-
tled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law; and
that all persons have corresponding obligations to the people and to the
[s]tate.
20. 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972).
21. See id. at 161.
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that the regulation was unconstitutional.22  The superior court up-
held the regulation as “reasonable.”23  The Alaska Supreme Court
reversed.24
In the majority opinion, joined by three other members of the
court, Justice Rabinowitz surveyed case law from state and federal
jurisdictions, noting that the courts had taken several different ap-
proaches and had reached conflicting conclusions concerning the
validity of school regulations regarding hair.25  In the absence of
uniformity, Justice Rabinowitz determined that the question of
whether Michael Breese had a right to wear his hair as he chose
and whether the school’s hair-length regulation was valid would be
decided strictly under the Alaska Constitution.26
Justice Rabinowitz began with the “established premise that
children are possessed of fundamental rights under the Alaska
[C]onstitution.”27 He found that public school students in Alaska
have a liberty interest, protected by article I, section 1 of the state
constitution, to wear their hair in accordance with their personal
tastes.28  He recognized that the right of individual liberty that is
often examined as a right of free expression is closely tied to the
right of privacy, or the right to be left alone.29  Justice Rabinowitz’s
opinion in Breese explains that
[t]he United States of America, and Alaska in particular, reflect
a pluralistic society, grounded upon such basic values as the
preservation of maximum individual choice, protection of mi-
nority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent lifestyles.  The
spectre of governmental control of the physical appearances of
private citizens, young and old, is antithetical to a free society,
contrary to our notions of a government of limited powers, and
repugnant to the concept of personal liberty. . . .  Whatever else
22. See id.
23. Id. at 162.
24. See id. at 175.
25. See id. at 165.
26. See id. at 166; see also id. at 167 (“[A]lthough sound analysis requires that
we look to the various federal precedents that have interpreted provisions of the
federal [C]onstitution that parallel Alaska’s constitution, we are not necessarily
limited by those precedents in expounding upon Alaska’s constitution.”).
27. Id. at 167.  Justice Rabinowitz authored one of the two cases cited as
authority for this established premise, RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971), in
which the court held that juveniles charged with a crime are entitled to a public
jury trial.  See id. at 33.  The other case, Doe v. State, 487 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1971),
also addressed minors’ rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and extended
to minors certain of the rights guaranteed to adult criminal defendants (such as an
adequate time to prepare a defense), but not all of the rights (such as the right to
an indictment).
28. See Breese, 501 P.2d at 168.
29. See id.
FELDMAN 07/17/98  9:38 AM
1998] RABINOWITZ AND PERSONAL FREEDOM 7
“liberty” may mean as used in article I, section 1 of the Alaska
[C]onstitution, we hold that the term at least encompasses the
fundamental personal right of students to select their own indi-
vidual hair styles without governmental direction.30
The determination that students have a fundamental constitu-
tional right to wear their hair in accordance with their personal
tastes was not the end of the analysis for the court.  As Justice
Rabinowitz wrote in Breese, and repeated in later cases, “‘personal
freedoms are not absolute; they must yield when they intrude upon
the freedom of others.’”31  The court thus had to decide the appli-
cable standard and burden of proof for evaluating a regulation that
infringed upon a fundamental right.  The court imposed on the
school district the “substantial burden” of establishing that a
regulation abridging a fundamental right was justified by a
“compelling governmental interest.”32  To attempt to justify the
hair-length regulations, the school district advanced its interest in
promoting discipline.  The supreme court concluded that the evi-
dence offered by the school district failed to prove any causal rela-
tionship between hair length and good behavior.  Accordingly, the
court declared the regulation invalid.33
From an historical perspective, the most significant portion of
the Breese opinion may not be its holding – although succeeding
generations of students have come to take for granted the freedom
to wear long hair, shaved heads, pierced noses, and baggy pants.
In the ensuing years, Breese is most cited, first, for its principles of
respect for autonomy and individuality and, second, for its mode of
analysis, particularly the standard the courts must apply in evalu-
ating regulations that impair fundamental interests.
Breese is cited in virtually every case in the past twenty-five
years in which litigants raised arguments about their rights to be
left alone and to express themselves free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental regulation.
IV.  RAVIN V. STATE: THE FIRST DECISION CONSTRUING THE
ALASKA CONSTITUTION’S RIGHT OF PRIVACY CLAUSE
In 1972, Alaska voters adopted a constitutional amendment
that created an explicit right to privacy.34  The first Alaska Su-
preme Court opinion to interpret the meaning of this section was
Ravin v. State,35 authored by Justice Rabinowitz.
30. Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 170 (quoting Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1075 (8th Cir. 1971)).
32. Id. at 171.
33. See id. at 171-74.
34. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
35. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).  The first reported supreme court opinion to
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Irwin Ravin, a lawyer, was arrested in December 1972 and
charged with criminal possession of marijuana.36  Ravin challenged
the constitutionality of the statute, contending that there was “no
legitimate state interest in prohibiting possession of marijuana by
adults for their personal use, in view of the right to privacy.”37  The
district court upheld the statute, and the superior court granted a
petition for review and subsequently affirmed the district court.38
The Alaska Supreme Court granted Ravin’s petition for review,39
reversed the lower courts, and remanded the matter to the district
court for further factual findings.40
The starting point for Justice Rabinowitz’s analysis was to de-
termine the level of scrutiny the court would employ in examining
the statute.41  Relying on Breese, Ravin argued that the Alaska
Constitution established privacy as a fundamental right, and there-
fore the state should be required to show a compelling interest in
prohibiting personal possession of marijuana.42  In response, as was
typical of Justice Rabinowitz’s decisions addressing new frontiers
for Alaska law, the Ravin opinion extensively reviewed U.S. Su-
preme Court jurisprudence and case law from other courts con-
cerning the nature of the privacy right implicated by government
restrictions on the right to possess and ingest marijuana.43  Addi-
tionally, the opinion reviewed the types of rights that other courts
designated as “fundamental”44 and reaffirmed Breese’s conclusion
that choice regarding personal appearance is a fundamental right.45
Justice Rabinowitz then determined that the right to ingest a par-
                                                                                                                                
mention the newly adopted privacy amendment was Gray v. State, 525 P.2d 524,
527 (Alaska 1974).  In Gray, the defendant argued that the statutory prohibition
of the use and sale of marijuana violated his constitutional right to privacy.  Be-
cause this issue was raised for the first time on the appeal, the court briefly ad-
dressed the matter and remanded for an evidentiary proceeding.  See id. at 527-
28.
36. Ravin was charged under Alaska Statutes section 17.12.010, which, in
relevant part, made it “unlawful for a person to manufacture, . . . possess, . . . or
distribute in any manner, a depressant, hallucinogenic, or stimulant drug.”
ALASKA STAT. § 17.12.010 (repealed 1982).  Alaska Statutes section 17.12.150 de-
fined “depressant, hallucinogenic, or stimulant drug” to include marijuana.  Id. §
17.12.150 (repealed 1982); see Ravin, 537 P.2d at 496 n.1.
37. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 496.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 513.  Ravin also raised due process and equal protection chal-
lenges to the statute, which the court rejected.  See id. at 512.
41. See id. at 497.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 498-503.
44. Id. at 501-02.
45. See id. at 500.
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ticular substance is a right of a different nature and could not be
termed “fundamental.”46  He stated that “[f]ew would believe that
they have been deprived of something of critical importance if de-
prived of marijuana, though they would if stripped of control over
their personal appearance.”47  Therefore, the “compelling interest”
test did not apply.48
Justice Rabinowitz observed that when government action in-
terferes with individual freedom in an area that is not character-
ized as fundamental, traditionally the courts have applied a ra-
tional basis test.49  However, Justice Rabinowitz noted that, in prior
constitutional law cases, the Alaska Supreme Court had begun to
express “considerable dissatisfaction” with the rigid two-tier analy-
sis, where the choice of tier largely determined whether a regula-
tion was stricken or upheld.50  Therefore, Justice Rabinowitz ap-
plied to Ravin’s privacy claims a mid-level analysis similar to the
test he employed in an earlier equal protection case, State v.
Wylie.51  The court stated the following:
It is appropriate in this case to resolve Ravin’s privacy claims by
determining whether there is a proper governmental interest in
imposing restrictions on marijuana use and whether the means
chosen bear a substantial relationship to the legislative purpose.
If governmental restrictions interfere with the individual’s right
to privacy, we will require that the relationship between means
and ends be not merely reasonable but close and substantial.52
The conclusion that the right to smoke marijuana is not a fun-
damental right did not end the analysis.  Applying mid-level scru-
tiny, Justice Rabinowitz conducted a detailed examination of the
right of privacy and the relevance of where the right is exercised.
Significantly, this mode of analysis allowed the court to shift focus
away from the “right to smoke marijuana” to questions implicated
by restrictions on personal behavior in the home.53
Drawing on both state and federal case law, Justice Rabinow-
itz observed that “[i]f there is any area of human activity to which
46. Id. at 502.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at 497-98.
50. See, e.g., Lynden Transport, Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700, 706 n.10 (Alaska
1975); State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 n.4 (Alaska 1973) (Rabinowitz, C.J.).
51. 516 P.2d 142 (Alaska 1973); see Ravin, 537 P.2d at 498.
52. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 498.
53. This shift of focus is especially interesting in light of the fact that, although
the circumstances surrounding Irwin Ravin’s arrest are not detailed in the opin-
ion, it was widely known in the legal community that Ravin was arrested in his car
and not in the privacy of his home.  The court could have disposed of Ravin’s case
narrowly on its facts without reaching the constitutional issues.
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a right to privacy pertains more than any other, it is the home.”54
Many activities that are lawful within the privacy of the home may
be prohibited in public.55  Justice Rabinowitz concluded that rec-
ognizing the importance of privacy in the home is
consonant with the character of life in Alaska.  Our territory and
now state has traditionally been the home of people who prize
their individuality and who have chosen to settle or to continue
living here in order to achieve a measure of control over their
own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of our
sister states.56
But, Justice Rabinowitz continued, repeating a theme from
Breese, the freedom to act as one wants, even in the privacy of the
home, is not unlimited.57  He explained that the right of privacy in
the home is limited to activities that are purely private and non-
commercial and that do not interfere in a serious manner with the
health, safety, rights, or privileges of others.58  Justice Rabinowitz
wrote that,
[i]ndeed, one aspect of a private matter is that it is private, that
is, that it does not adversely affect persons beyond the actor, and
hence is none of their business.  When a matter does affect the
public, directly or indirectly, it loses its wholly private character,
and can be made to yield when an appropriate public need is
demonstrated.59
Applying this analysis, Justice Rabinowitz concluded that citi-
zens of Alaska “have a basic right to privacy in their homes under
Alaska’s constitution. . . .  [This right] encompasses the possession
and ingestion of substances such as marijuana in a purely personal,
non-commercial context . . . .”60  In the balancing analysis that has
become the trademark of Alaska’s constitutional cases, Justice
Rabinowitz declared that personal privacy may be restricted by the
state only if the state can meet its substantial burden by demon-
strating a legitimate state interest in proscribing the private use of
marijuana.61  Furthermore, the state must show a “close and sub-
stantial relationship between the public welfare and control of in-
gestion or possession of marijuana in the home for personal use.”62
Significantly, the Ravin court rejected arguments that the state
could regulate marijuana use even without evidence that the drug
54. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 503.
55. See id.
56. Id. at 504.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. Id.
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was harmful to the user or to others.63  The court stated, “We be-
lieve this tenet to be basic to a free society.  The state cannot im-
pose its own notions of morality, propriety, or fashion on individu-
als when the public has no legitimate interest in the affairs of those
individuals.”64
The Ravin opinion carefully considered the evidence adduced
by both sides regarding the effects of marijuana.65  The court found
the evidence contradictory and inconclusive and held that the state
had failed to meet its burden of proving that marijuana was a dan-
ger to the user or to others.66  Without such proof, the court held,
the state lacked sufficient basis for breaching the privacy of an in-
dividual’s home.67
Justice Rabinowitz defined four areas as to which the state
provided sufficient evidence to justify restrictions on marijuana
use: driving under the influence of marijuana, possession or use of
marijuana by minors, possession or use of marijuana in public, and
sale or possession of quantities indicative of intent to sell the
drug.68  However, Justice Rabinowitz was careful to stress that the
court did not endorse the use of psychoactive drugs.  The opinion
expresses a philosophy of individual responsibility that must ac-
company individual freedom:
It is the responsibility of every individual to consider carefully
the ramifications for himself and for those around him of using
such substances.  With the freedom which our society offers to
each of us to order our lives as we see fit goes the duty to live re-
sponsibly, for our own sakes and for society’s.  This result can
best be achieved, we believe, without the use of psychoactive
substances.69
Ravin, like Breese, has been cited frequently in cases involving
issues of privacy and personal freedom.70  The balancing analysis
63. See id. at 509.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 504-11.
66. See id. at 511.
67. See id.
68. See id.  Subsequent to Ravin, the legislature rewrote the criminal laws, de-
criminalizing adults’ possession of small amounts of marijuana in the privacy of
their homes.  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060 (1982) (amended 1990).  The Alaska
courts upheld the continuing prohibitions on the sale of marijuana and possession
by minors.  See Brown v. State, 565 P.2d 179 (Alaska 1977); Belgarde v. State, 543
P.2d 206 (Alaska 1975); Allam v. State, 830 P.2d 435 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). A
1990 initiative re-criminalized all marijuana possession.  See 1990 Initiative Pro-
posal No. 2, § 1, amending ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.060(a).  The constitutionality of
the initiative has been questioned widely, but the Alaska Supreme Court has not
had occasion to rule on the issue.
69. Ravin, 537 P.2d at 511-12.
70. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 834 (Alaska 1976) (citing Ravin to
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that Justice Rabinowitz elucidated in Ravin is employed in virtu-
ally all of those cases.  In a wide variety of areas, the court has ad-
hered to the position that the government may not impose its stan-
dards of morality on the citizens of the state and that individual
freedoms may be limited only where there is a sufficient justifica-
tion.71
The following sections of this Article explore certain areas of
law in which the principles expounded by Justice Rabinowitz in
Breese and Ravin have shaped the Alaska Supreme Court’s deci-
sions during the past twenty-five years.  The Article focuses on
opinions by Justice Rabinowitz, but also notes key opinions
authored by other justices based on Rabinowitz’s seminal deci-
sions.
V.  PRIVACY AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CASES
Many litigants seized on the broad, pro-individual freedom
language in Breese and Ravin to claim they had protected rights to
engage in a wide range of activities: the right not to wear a motor-
cycle helmet,72 the right to engage in prostitution and nude mas-
sage,73 the right to be a runaway child,74 and the right to distribute
political literature anonymously.75
Applying the standards articulated in Breese and Ravin, the
Alaska Supreme Court rejected most of these challenges, finding
that the government had a legitimate public welfare rationale for
regulating the challenged conduct.76  In other cases, however, the
court took a strong stand protecting free expression regardless of
content.77  Justice Rabinowitz joined in all of these cases, with one
                                                                                                                                
support state measures that required adult supervision of a chronic runaway mi-
nor); Jordan v. Reed, 544 P.2d 75, 81 (Alaska 1975) (applying Ravin to an alleged
infringement of the right to vote).
71. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1977) (finding sufficient
justification in the regulation of adolescent sexual activity); Belgarde v. State, 543
P.2d 206 (Alaska 1975) (upholding the state proscription on the sale of marijuana
to minors).
72. See Kingery v. Chapple, 504 P.2d 831, 835 n.6 (Alaska 1972).
73. See Hilbers v. Municipality of Anchorage, 611 P.2d 31, 42 (Alaska 1980);
Summers v. Anchorage, 589 P.2d 863, 869-70 (Alaska 1979).
74. See L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976).
75. See Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81 (Alaska 1980).
76. In Messerli, the court recognized that there could be instances where an
individual’s right to free expression could outweigh the public interest in knowing
the name, address, and occupation of the person who purchased political adver-
tising.  The court directed the Alaska Public Offices Commission to develop ap-
propriate regulations.  See id. at 88.
77. See, e.g., Vogler v. Miller, 660 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1983) (“Vogler v. Miller
II”); Vogler v. Miller, 651 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982) (“Vogler v. Miller I”) (both in-
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exception where he wrote a separate concurring opinion.78  He also
authored two other opinions on the periphery of free speech and
expression issues, both times protecting the right of expression.79
When cases were presented as privacy questions, distinct from
free expression cases, the court again applied the balancing analy-
sis developed in Breese and Ravin to declare the limits of the right
of privacy.  In Falcon v. Alaska Public Offices Commission,80 the
court rejected an appointed public official’s claim that he should
not be required to disclose the names of any of his private business
customers or clients, but held that in some circumstances a medical
patient’s right of privacy might outweigh the public’s right to know
the clients and customers of public officials and candidates for
public office.81  In Doe v. Alaska Superior Court,82 the court held
that individuals who write letters to the governor concerning po-
tential appointees do not have a protected privacy interest in their
letters.83  In Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc.,84  the court
held that an individual’s private right to smoke marijuana during
non-work hours did not preclude an employer from requiring the
employee to submit to a drug test designed to detect whether the
employee was under the influence of drugs while on the job.85  Jus-
tice Rabinowitz joined the majority in these three decisions.
Justice Rabinowitz also authored two opinions that present ar-
ticulate examples of the thoughtful balancing of interests com-
manded by Breese and Ravin.  In Department of Revenue v. Ol-
                                                                                                                                
validating statutes placing restrictions on ballot access by third-party candidates);
Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818 (Alaska 1982) (invalidating ordinance
prohibiting nude dancing); Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951
(Alaska 1978) (prohibiting municipality from excluding Gay Coalition from a
booklet on city organizations based upon the beliefs of its members); see also
Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (holding that the state did not meet
its burden of proving a compelling state interest to justify prohibition of Native
Alaskans’ religious practice of hunting out of season for a funeral potlatch).
78. See Vogler v. Miller II, 660 P.2d at 1196 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
79. See Mathis v. Sauser, 942 P.2d 1117, 1122 (Alaska 1997) (protecting prison
inmates’ rights of expression by disapproving regulation designed to eliminate
litigation that prison officials regard as “frivolous”); Mount Juneau Enter., Inc. v.
Juneau Empire, 891 P.2d 829, 837 (Alaska 1995) (explaining that Alaska, unlike
some jurisdictions, applies “actual malice” standard in defamation cases involving
a public issue, even when plaintiff is not a public figure, in order to “protect the
free exchange of ideas”).
80. 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977).
81. See id. at 480.
82. 721 P.2d 617 (Alaska 1986).
83. See id. at 629-30.
84. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
85. See id. at 1133-37.
FELDMAN 07/17/98  9:38 AM
14 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [15:1
iver,86 the taxpayer-defendants proffered numerous grounds for
why they should not be required to disclose personal financial in-
formation.87  Although Justice Rabinowitz rejected most of the
claims, his opinion recognized that individuals do have a protected
privacy interest in their personal financial records.88  Applying the
balancing test set forth in Breese, Justice Rabinowitz concluded
that the state’s compelling interest in obtaining information essen-
tial for computing taxes justified requiring individuals to produce
financial records.89  However, the state must proceed using the
least intrusive method for obtaining the necessary information.90
The court held that the state may compel production of papers that
are not “purely private” such as W-2 forms, checking account rec-
ords, and other documents not generated in the privacy of the
home, but the government may not compel production of purely
private papers unless it shows in the particular case that it cannot
determine tax liability without this additional invasion of the indi-
vidual’s privacy.91
Justice Rabinowitz mandated the “least intrusive method”
approach in a different context in In re Mendel.92  Mendel was an
attorney who represented a fugitive parent in a hotly contested
custody case and related civil tort suit.93  The client’s friends estab-
lished a legal defense fund and sold T-shirts to help defray legal
costs.94  Mendel was asked to disclose the names of those who con-
tributed to the fund.  She resisted disclosure, contending that indi-
viduals who contribute to a legal defense fund have a protected
privacy interest in their freedom of association, and that this pri-
vacy may be invaded only following a showing of genuine need for
the information and only after taking steps to minimize infringe-
ment of the individuals’ First Amendment rights.95  The trial court
held Mendel in contempt for refusing to supply the requested in-
formation.96  Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Rabinowitz re-
versed, accepting Mendel’s arguments that the courts must take
steps to protect individuals’ associational privacy.97
Justice Rabinowitz expressed independent views in a few of
86. 636 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1981).
87. See id. at 1157-58.
88. See id. at 1166.
89. See id. at 1166-67.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1166-68.
92. 897 P.2d 68 (Alaska 1995).
93. See id. at 70-71.
94. See id. at 76.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 70.
97. See id. at 76-77.
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the free expression and privacy cases decided during his tenure on
the court.  For example, in Vogler v. Miller I,98 he joined the ma-
jority in analyzing a small political party’s right to be listed on an
election ballot as a quintessential free expression issue, because
voting is one of the most important ways citizens can express
themselves.  The court invalidated a statute requiring a candidate
to obtain petitions containing signatures equal in number to 3% of
the votes cast in the preceding general election in order be listed
on the gubernatorial ballot.99  In a follow-up opinion, the court also
invalidated as too restrictive a statute requiring a new party to ob-
tain 10% of the vote in one gubernatorial election in order to have
a candidate listed on the primary ballot for the next election.100
The majority opinion noted that a requirement to obtain 5% of the
vote passed constitutional muster in other states, intimating that it
might be constitutional in Alaska also.101 Justice Rabinowitz issued
a separate concurrence to express a view that was even more pro-
tective of small parties’ rights.102  He emphasized the need to apply
the compelling interest standard rigorously in instances where a
statute restricts access to the ballot, and, focusing on the unique-
ness of Alaska, he stressed that a legal standard appropriate in
other states might not be constitutional in Alaska:
I do not join in the court’s intimation that the state could meet
its burden of justifying a lower percentage definition of political
party merely by citing the existence of arithmetically similar
statutes in the other jurisdictions.  Other states are different geo-
graphically from Alaska, have different voter populations, are
governed by their own unique constitutional guarantees and
have statutory patterns of election laws that may vary substan-
tially from that in Alaska.  Unexplained numbers cannot be used
to inform this court of its constitutional responsibilities.103
Justice Rabinowitz also wrote a special concurrence in Allred
v. State.104  Allred was a murder case tried before the adoption of
the Alaska Rules of Evidence.  Shortly after his arrest, the defen-
dant asked to speak with either a psychiatrist or with a counselor
from a drug program, with whom he had an established counseling
relationship.  When the counselor came to the police station and
spoke with the defendant, the defendant confessed to shooting the
98. 651 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1982).
99. See id. at 4-6.
100. See Vogler v. Miller II, 660 P.2d 1192, 1195-96 (Alaska 1983); see also in-
fra note 79.
101. See id. at 1195 & n.5.
102. See id. at 1196 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
103. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
104. 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976).
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victim.105  The defendant later moved to preclude the counselor
from testifying at trial about the statement.106  A majority of the
Alaska Supreme Court accepted Allred’s arguments that the court
should recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege; the majority
opinion drew heavily on the need to protect the individual’s expec-
tation of privacy in such conversations.107  The author of the court’s
opinion and one other justice believed that the evidentiary privi-
lege should extend only to communications with a licensed psy-
chiatrist or psychologist, not to a counselor such as the one who
spoke with Allred.108  Justice Rabinowitz drafted a special concur-
rence, stating his belief that the privilege also should apply to non-
licensed mental health counselors because patients have the same
expectation of privacy in such conversations.109  Two other justices
reached the same result.110
Justice Rabinowitz’s practical approach, emphasizing reason-
able laypersons’ expectations rather than the importance of a spe-
cialized degree, had the effect of providing the same protection to
poorer people, who would be more likely to rely on a paraprofes-
sional counselor, as to wealthier individuals, who could afford a
psychiatrist’s services.  This same solicitude for the rights of the
poor is reflected in some of Justice Rabinowitz’s search and sei-
zure cases.111
Justice Rabinowitz dissented from the majority view in one
free expression case, Friedman v. District Court.112  Friedman was
an attorney who practiced in Homer.  He was told by two judges
that he was required to wear an appropriate coat and tie when he
appeared in court, then was fined small amounts by both judges
when he refused to comply with the court’s unwritten dress code
for attorneys.113  He appealed the penalties, contending that the
courts have no power to direct an attorney’s attire so long as it is
105. See id. at 413.
106. See id.
107. See id. at  417, 421.
108. See id. at 418-21.
109. See id. at 425 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
110. See id. at 422.  Justice Dimond joined Justice Rabinowitz’s concurring
opinion.  Chief Justice Boochever wrote a separate concurrence.
111. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 799 (Alaska 1973) (Rabinowitz,
C.J., dissenting) (discussed infra at Part VII); see also State v. Albert, 899 P.2d
103, 120-32 (Alaska 1995) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (Justice Rabinowitz joined
one other justice in dissenting from approval of a court rule that requires indigent
criminal defendants to pay part of the costs of appointed counsel, regardless of
their ability to pay).
112. 611 P.2d 77 (Alaska 1980).
113. See id. at 77.
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not disruptive of judicial proceedings.114  The majority of the
Alaska Supreme Court upheld the power of the court to establish a
dress code and to sanction lawyers who did not abide by it, al-
though the court reversed Friedman’s penalties on procedural
grounds.115  Justice Rabinowitz dissented.  In his view, the case was
controlled by Breese:
Given the personal liberty interest involved, I am of the view
that no attorney should be subject to contempt proceedings so
long as her or his attire does not interfere with the judicial pro-
ceedings or manifest disrespect for the court.  Distracting or bi-
zarre attire should not be permitted to infringe upon the dignity
of the judiciary and its proceedings.  But where these interests
are not implicated, it is my view that judicial infringement upon
the personal liberty of counsel to choose their mode of attire is
antithetical to Alaska’s constitution.116
Justice Rabinowitz recently dissented in another free expres-
sion case, Thoma v. Hickel,117 where, atypically, his dissent placed
him in the position of being arguably less protective than his col-
leagues of the right of uninhibited speech.118  Thoma was an envi-
ronmental activist who filed an ethics complaint against then-
Governor Hickel.119  Thoma alleged that Hickel retaliated against
him by improperly accessing public safety records and publicizing
disparaging remarks about him, including his criminal record.
Thoma sued Hickel on a variety of legal theories, including 42
U.S.C. § 1983, for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights.
Thoma contended that the governor’s action was intended to re-
taliate and thus to squelch the exercise of free speech.120  The ma-
jority of the Alaska Supreme Court rejected Thoma’s § 1983 claim,
holding that imposing liability on a public official who “responds in
kind” to protected speech critical of the official would not be con-
sistent with the First Amendment.121  Justice Rabinowitz and his
dissenting colleague believed that to allow liability would not
threaten First Amendment values, since, in their view, what was at
issue was conduct and not speech.122
This survey of cases shows the wide variety of settings in
114. See id. at 78.
115. See id. at 79.  The majority considered that practicing law is a privilege
that may be subject to reasonable conditions, including reasonable rules of court-
room decorum.  See id. at 78.
116. Id. at 80  (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
117. 947 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1997).
118. See id. at 825 (Carpeneti, J., and Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
119. See id. at 818.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 821.
122. See id. at 826 (Carpeneti, J., and Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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which the Alaska Supreme Court has recognized limitations on
government action in order to protect individual rights of privacy
and free expression.  While far from radical or libertarian, the
court’s cases reflect a thoughtful balancing of government and per-
sonal interests.  Justice Rabinowitz contributed significantly to the
court’s case law; most of the cases build on the analyses he articu-
lated in Breese and Ravin.  When Justice Rabinowitz disagreed
with his colleagues, his own views generally placed him arguing for
even greater protection of individual rights.  This same pattern is
seen in other areas of the supreme court’s cases, such as family
law, discussed below, where again Justice Rabinowitz led the court
toward greater protection of individual freedoms and the right to
be different.
VI.  FAMILY LAW CASES
Justice Rabinowitz’s belief that society must tolerate individ-
ual differences and not penalize those who do not adhere to the
cultural norm had a strong influence on his opinions concerning
child custody and other aspects of family law.  Several of his opin-
ions played an important part in shaping the jurisprudence of the
Alaska Supreme Court in this area.
One important early decision was Carle v. Carle.123  In Carle,
Justice Rabinowitz addressed issues arising in a custody case in
which one parent lived a traditional Native life in a small village
while the other parent lived a more westernized, urban lifestyle.124
In the lower court proceedings, the judge concluded that the best
interest of the child justified awarding custody to the mother, the
more urbanized parent, in part because the judge believed that the
Native culture is “inevitably succumbing” to the predominant cau-
casian, urban culture.125  The judge concluded that the child would
be better served if allowed to make the transition to the urban cul-
ture while still young.126  The father appealed from this determina-
tion, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the custody award,
remanding for reconsideration without improper denigration of
the Native lifestyle.127
Writing for the full court, Justice Rabinowitz found it
“impermissible” for a court to decide a custody question “on the
hypothesis that it is necessary to facilitate the child’s adjustment to
what is believed to be the dominant culture.”128 Justice Rabinowitz
123. 503 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1972).
124. See id. at 1052-55.
125. Id. at 1055.
126. See id. at 1054.
127. See id. at 1053-54.
128. Id. at 1055.
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declared that the only proper focus for the custody decision is on
the fitness of the parent and the parent’s ability to accord the child
a meaningful parent-child relationship.  “It is not the function of
our courts to homogenize Alaskan society.”129  Making clear that
tolerance for diversity is not limited to free speech and expression
cases, Justice Rabinowitz repeated philosophy he had first ex-
pressed in Breese: “‘The United States of America, and Alaska in
particular, reflect a pluralistic society, grounded upon such basic
values as the preservation of maximum individual choice, protec-
tion of minority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent life-
styles.’”130
Justice Rabinowitz applied the same principle of tolerance in
Horutz v. Horutz,131 a case raising questions about the extent to
which courts may consider a parent’s individual choices in a moral
light when making custody determinations.  Writing again for the
full court, Justice Rabinowitz reversed a trial court’s custody
award to a father and remanded for further proceedings where the
trial judge based the award largely on the mother’s character and
lifestyle, rather than on evidence of how the mother’s actions had
affected the child.132  In particular, Justice Rabinowitz stated that it
appeared that “the trial court might possibly have assigned too
great a weight to the respective sexual conduct of the parties with-
out determining what impact such conduct had on the parties[‘] pa-
rental relationship to [their son].”133  As in Carle, the supreme
court remanded the case with directions to focus on only the le-
gally relevant criteria.134
Justice Rabinowitz’s opinions in Carle and Horutz have been
relied upon in many decisions over the years, as the Alaska Su-
preme Court has repeatedly reiterated that the only proper focus
of child custody decisions is the welfare of the child; thus, concerns
for parents’ lifestyles may not affect the custody decision except to
the extent the lifestyle affects the parent’s relationship with the
child.135
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972)).
131. 560 P.2d 397 (Alaska 1977).
132. See id. at 400-01.
133. Id. at 401.
134. See id. at 402.
135. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (finding that the
trial court erred in awarding custody to the father where the ruling was premised
in large part on the fact that the mother was a lesbian); Craig v. McBride, 639
P.2d 303 (Alaska 1982) (holding that the trial court erred in basing award of cus-
tody to the father in part on the fact that the mother had borne children out of
wedlock, but holding that continuity of parental residence location was a factor
properly considered); Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska  1979) (stating
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Justice Rabinowitz joined the majority in each of the above
cases in which he participated.  He wrote a special concurrence in
Craig v. McBride,136 expressing his view that even the majority’s
position of apparent tolerance for divergent lifestyles reflected
stereotypical assumptions that he believed should not be the basis
for a custody decision.  He wrote, “I cannot emphasize too strongly
that trial judges must guard against injecting socialized, stereo-
typed assumptions and misconceptions into custody decisions.”137
The majority, while criticizing the trial court for placing too much
emphasis on the mother’s frequent moves, opined that the ability
to provide a stable home in one community was “undeniably rele-
vant” to the determination of which parent could better provide
for the child.138  According to Justice Rabinowitz, this assumption
denigrated the parent’s chosen lifestyle and represented a lifestyle
conflict between the judges and the parent.139  He noted that the
idea that a stable life in one community is preferable to frequently
moving a child from city to city is “an assumption with which many
persons would not agree.”140  Alaska has a large number of military
families, and Justice Rabinowitz used them to illustrate his point:
[T]he fact that the physical location of a child’s home changes
may have little or no bearing on the stability of the home.  Sta-
bility is often a function of parental attitude and not of geogra-
phy.  To use a familiar example, I am certain that many of the
servicemen and women in this state would be surprised to learn
that they are not providing stable homes for their children be-
cause their careers may require frequent moves.141
Justice Rabinowitz believed that a parent’s “nomadic life” should
not be considered relevant in a custody dispute absent evidence
that this way of life has a demonstrable impact on the child.142
The themes expressed in Justice Rabinowitz’s early child cus-
tody cases recur throughout his family law opinions.  One recent
                                                                                                                                
that the trial court erred in giving weight to the fact that one parent and not the
other would raise the child as a member of an organized religion); Britt v. Britt,
567 P.2d 308 (Alaska 1977) (ruling that the trial court erred in emphasizing the
parent’s habits and character, without considering how the parent’s actions af-
fected her relationship with her child); Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska
1977) (holding that the trial court did not err in awarding custody to the mother, a
strict Jehovah’s Witness; supreme court also rejected “tender years” doctrine,
saying that henceforth there would be no stereotypical presumption in favor of
the mother, even for custody of very young children).
136. 639 P.2d 303 (Alaska 1982).
137. Id. at 307 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
138. Id. at 305 (“Clearly stability is a proper consideration.”).
139. See id. at 307-08 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
140. Id. at 308 (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
141. Id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
142. Id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., concurring).
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example is Mariscal v. Watkins.143  Writing for the majority, Justice
Rabinowitz held that the superior court erred in placing on a par-
ent conditions that seemed to reflect moral judgments and a desire
to impose the judge’s notions of proper behavior.144  These condi-
tions directed that the parent not use alcohol in the child’s pres-
ence, not drive the child anywhere within twelve hours of having
had even a single alcoholic drink, and not expose the child to
“inappropriate sexual behavior.”145  Since there was no evidence
that the parent had a drinking problem or that her past sexual con-
duct had affected the child, the supreme court found these condi-
tions to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.146  Justice Rabi-
nowitz repeated a caution expressed by the supreme court in
Craig, and reminded trial judges “‘[t]o avoid even the suggestion
that a custody award stems from a lifestyle conflict between a trial
judge and a parent.’”147  As Justice Rabinowitz explained, “[t]his
caution reflects not only a concern that the superior court consider
proper factors in making a custody decision, but also that the supe-
rior court not unnecessarily impose its moral values upon a liti-
gant.”148
One recent decision by the supreme court, in which Justice
Rabinowitz did not participate, proves that his efforts to enforce
tolerance and respect in the family law area will have a lasting im-
pact.  In Jones v. Jones,149 the court addressed questions arising
from the division of property in a divorce case.150  It criticized the
lower court for penalizing the husband for contributing to the fail-
ure of the marriage by his illegal gambling.151  The court wrote,
We generally share the concern reflected in [the husband’s] ar-
gument that value judgments concerning the nature of discre-
tionary spending during a marriage should be avoided.  What
seems wasteful to one party may be a treasured source of solace
to another, and it should generally not be for the judge to say
which is which.152
One other family law opinion authored by Justice Rabinowitz
deserves special mention in this survey of how his influence shaped
Alaska’s case law to respect the pluralism in this state.  In Calista
143. 914 P.2d 219 (Alaska 1996).
144. See id. at 221-22.
145. Id. at 222.
146. See id.
147. Id. (quoting Craig, 639 P.2d at 306).
148. Id.
149. 942 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1997).
150. See id. at 1135.
151. See id at 1139-41.
152. Id. at 1139.
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Corp. v. Mann,153 with Justice Rabinowitz writing for four of the
justices,154 the Alaska Supreme Court recognized the principle of
equitable adoption in probate cases involving intestate succes-
sion.155  This doctrine allows a court to award the property of a de-
ceased adult to a foster child who was “adopted” and treated as a
member of the family within Indian or Eskimo village culture, but
who was never formally adopted under the laws of the state.156  Jus-
tice Rabinowitz regarded it as necessary to recognize traditional
Native “adoptions” in order to avoid hardship “created in part by
the diversity of cultures found within this jurisdiction.”157  He
quoted Breese on the importance of preserving a pluralistic soci-
ety,158 then expanded on this theme with specific reference to the
Native values and customs:
One factor which makes Alaska particularly unique . . . is the
existence of various Native cultures which remain today much as
they were prior to the infusion of Anglo-American culture.
While from a sociological standpoint the diversity of lifestyles
has added strength to the cultural mosaic which comprises the
Alaska community, it has created problems in administering a
unified justice system sensitive to the needs of the various cul-
tures.159
153. 564 P.2d 53 (Alaska 1977).
154. The fifth justice concurred separately in the result.  See id. at 62
(Boochever, C.J., concurring).
155. See id. at 61.
156. See id. at 58-62.
157. Id. at 62.
158. See id. at 61 (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 169 (Alaska 1972))
(“‘The United States of America, and Alaska in particular, reflect a pluralistic so-
ciety, grounded upon such basic values as the preservation of maximum individ-
ual choice, protection of minority sentiments, and appreciation for divergent life-
styles.’”).
159. Id.  The idea that the state judiciary must adapt in order to be fair to peo-
ple of diverse cultures, especially the indigenous Native cultures, is a recurrent
theme in cases decided during Justice Rabinowitz’s tenure on the court.  The
Calista Corp. opinion, for example, relies in part on a criminal case:
“The Anglo-American system of justice differs substantially from the
traditional Indian, Eskimo and Aleut systems, which predated Western
cultures by hundreds of years.  The cultural difficulties experienced by
many of the Alaska Natives as the contemporary Anglo-American insti-
tutions reach out to the bush communities require that the [s]tate legal
system use extreme care in cases of this nature.”
Id. (quoting Gregory v. State, 550 P.2d 374, 379 n.5 (Alaska 1976)); see Aguchak
v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 520 P.2d 1352, 1356, 1358 n.34 (Alaska 1974)
(setting aside a default judgment entered in a small claims case brought by a de-
partment store against a consumer who resided in a remote village and establish-
ing a new requirement that plaintiffs in small claims cases give rural defendants
notice of their right to request that the case be moved to a more convenient loca-
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VII.  CRIMINAL CASES
Respect for individual privacy and divergent lifestyle choices
is also seen in Justice Rabinowitz’s criminal law decisions.  There
are numerous criminal cases in which Justice Rabinowitz and
members of the appellate courts applied the concepts articulated in
Breese and Ravin.160  This part of the Article first examines a series
of search and seizure opinions written by Justice Rabinowitz, be-
cause these cases, defining the limits on warrantless searches and
seizures, are closely tied to attitudes on personal privacy and re-
spect for the individual, even the individual accused of a crime.
This part then briefly explores other areas in criminal law where
the Alaska Supreme Court has relied on the same values expressed
in Breese and Ravin to expand individual rights beyond those pro-
vided by the U.S. Constitution.  Many of these decisions, both
those written by Justice Rabinowitz and those written by other jus-
tices, are more protective of individual privacy and the rights of
those who live outside the mainstream culture than are cases by
the federal judiciary and courts of other states construing compa-
                                                                                                                                
tion); Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska 1971) (requiring jury panels in
criminal cases to be selected in ways that will increase the diversity of the venire
when the crime occurred in a remote area, so that the likelihood that the jury will
include others familiar with the defendant’s lifestyle will be greater).
160. See, e.g., Mossberg v. State, 624 P.2d 796, 799 & n.8 (Alaska 1981) (finding
police justified in assuming that warrant requirement to monitor defendant’s con-
versations did not apply to conversations outside the home); Anderson v. State,
562 P.2d 351, 358 (Alaska 1977) (refusing to decide whether the right to privacy
articulated by the court in Ravin protects certain private sexual practices commit-
ted by consensual adults in their homes); Anderson v. State, 555 P.2d 251, 261 &
n.44 (Alaska 1976) (“While the warrant permitted an intrusion of substantial
magnitude, . . . it did not provide authorization for the ‘general’ search which is
constitutionally abhorred.”); Gibson v. State, 930 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1997) (recognizing Ravin’s protection of an individual’s privacy at home, but
emphasizing that even privacy may be infringed upon at times); Earley v. State,
789 P.2d 374, 376 & n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990) (finding the Ravin right to privacy
in one’s house does not equal permission to argue loudly enough to disturb
sleeping neighbors); Punguk v. State, 784 P.2d 246, 247 & n.1 (Alaska Ct. App.
1989) (holding that Ravin protection did not require a searching officer to adopt
the “least intrusive means” of protecting against destruction of evidence); Cleland
v. State, 759 P.2d 553, 556 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (upholding the constitutionality
of a prison contraband statute that made it illegal for inmates to possess mari-
juana, even though under Ravin they could possess small quantities of marijuana
in their homes upon release); State v. Weaver, 736 P.2d 781, 783 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987) (“‘No one has an absolute right to do things in the privacy of his own home
which will affect himself or others adversely.’” (quoting Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d
494, 504 (Alaska 1975)); McKenzie v. Municipality of Anchorage, 631 P.2d 514,
518 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in con-
ducting a gambling operation in a public bar).
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rable constitutional provisions.
Two of Justice Rabinowitz’s early opinions on privacy and
search and seizure issues are dissents.  In McCoy v. State,161 the
majority of the court upheld the search of an arrestee at the police
station, and affirmed the right of the police to open, without a war-
rant, a wrapped packet removed from the arrestee’s pocket.162
Suspecting that the packet contained drugs, the police searched it
even though it was in police control and there was no longer any
risk that it would be destroyed before they could obtain a war-
rant.163  Justice Rabinowitz dissented from the portion of the opin-
ion that stated no warrant was required to open the packet.164  He
began his analysis by quoting Justice Frankfurter, who wrote that
“[i]t is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of lib-
erty have frequently been forged in controversies involving not
very nice people.  And so, while we are concerned here with a
shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of
what are really the great themes expressed by the Fourth
Amendment.”165
The defendant in McCoy was charged with possession of co-
caine.166  Despite the “opprobrium” attached to the offense, Justice
Rabinowitz believed it was essential to protect the right of all citi-
zens, including drug users, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.167  In his view, once the packet was in police control, the exi-
gency that justified the warrantless seizure disappeared, and,
accordingly, any further invasion of the individual’s privacy should
be based on a search warrant.168  This preference for a warrant, as a
shield that protects the individual against unreasonable govern-
mental intrusions, recurs throughout Justice Rabinowitz’s criminal
opinions.
Justice Rabinowitz’s second significant dissent came in Smith
v. State.169  There, the majority of the court held that an individual
has no protected privacy interest in materials that had been placed
in an apartment building dumpster.170  The majority determined
that, once materials are deposited in the dumpster, the individual
has indicated an intent to abandon the property and therefore can
161. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971).
162. See id. at 131.
163. See id. at 131-39.
164. See id. at 139-43 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 139 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rabinow-
itz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
166. See id. at 128.
167. See id. at 140 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 140-41 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
169. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973).
170. See id. at 796-99.
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have no subjective expectation of privacy.171 The majority also con-
cluded that any expectation of privacy would not be one that soci-
ety would recognize as reasonable.172
Justice Rabinowitz disagreed with his colleagues.173  He argued
that individuals who place bags in a dumpster have a reasonable
expectation of privacy from governmental intrusion into the mate-
rials in the dumpster, and that therefore the police should not be
permitted to search the dumpster without a warrant.174  In a senti-
ment he would echo in his later cases, Justice Rabinowitz wrote, “I
think it is essential to recognize that a free and open society cannot
exist without the right of the people to be immune from unreason-
able interference by representatives of their government.”175  In
addition, Justice Rabinowitz commented on several aspects of the
majority decision that in practice would extend greater privacy
rights to wealthier citizens.  For example, the majority suggested
that an individual who disposes of materials in a garbage can close
to his own single family home might have a greater expectation of
privacy than a person who disposes of materials in a dumpster
shared by other apartment dwellers.176  Justice Rabinowitz em-
phatically disapproved of this result:
I disagree with the majority’s holding insofar as it discriminates
between the right to privacy of citizens occupying a single family
dwelling, and those living in multiple unit dwelling places. . . .
Nowhere in the text of the [F]ourth [A]mendment, article I, sec-
tion 14 or article I, section 22 is the proviso, “for property own-
ers only.”  Many, if not most, of our citizens cannot afford to
own their own homes and live in single family dwellings.  Fur-
ther, some persons may prefer to live in apartments or condo-
miniums.  Moreover, many urban dwellers are obliged to reside
in high rise apartment buildings, due to the crowded spatial con-
ditions of our cities.  To make the protection of the [F]ourth
[A]mendment, article I, section 14 or article I, section 22 depend
upon the economic status of an individual, life-style preferences
and urban spatial conditions is, in my opinion, unacceptable. . . .
In other words, I am convinced that a resident’s expectation that
the police will not be scavenging through his or her garbage
when such refuse is deposited in the only available waste recep-
171. See id. at 796-98.
172. See id. at 798-99 (“[A]ny tenant in the [defendant’s apartments] could be
sure that periodically a group of third persons would look into the dumpster and
possibly scavenge items therefrom.”).
173. See id. at 799-805 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 799 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 797-98 (“We observe, without so deciding, that [trash located
close to a single family dwelling] would be a strong case for holding the expecta-
tion of privacy to be reasonable.”).
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tacle for the living unit remains the same, whether the dweller
resides in a split-level ranch home in the suburbs or in a crowded
tenement in the inner city.177
Approximately four years later, in Woods & Rohde, Inc. v.
State,178 Justice Rabinowitz wrote one of the court’s first majority
criminal law opinions decided squarely on the basis of the Alaska
Constitution.  Expanding on what he had written in Smith, Justice
Rabinowitz treated the adoption of article I, section 22 as under-
scoring the importance of the right of privacy in Alaska and sup-
porting adoption of stricter controls on warrantless government ac-
tion than is required under the federal Constitution.179  Finding the
federal precedent ambiguous, the court held that the state consti-
tution prohibits warrantless administrative inspections of business
premises.180
Continuing to emphasize both the importance of a warrant
and that Alaska’s constitutional privacy protections are broader
than those provided by the federal Constitution, Justice Rabinow-
itz authored two more majority opinions in the next few years that
expanded defendants’ privacy rights.  In State v. Daniel,181 the court
held unconstitutional a warrantless search of a briefcase that
troopers took out of a vehicle they had impounded following the
driver’s arrest for driving while intoxicated.182  The majority opin-
ion follows the logic of Justice Rabinowitz’s dissent in McCoy,
finding that a warrant was required to open the briefcase after it
was lawfully seized, since there was no exigency to justify a war-
rantless search once the briefcase was in police control.183  The
court rejected the state’s argument that routine inventory searches
are rebuttably presumed to be reasonable and that they conse-
quently should be considered an exception to the warrant re-
quirement.184  The court concluded that “protection of the interiors
of closed luggage, briefcases, containers and packages transported
in a vehicle reflects fundamental expectations of privacy which
Alaska society would recognize as reasonable.”185  In comments
reminiscent of his dissent in Smith, Justice Rabinowitz also re-
177. Id. at 805 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).  This eloquent opinion reflects
Justice Rabinowitz’s New York City roots.  There were no crowded inner city
tenements in Alaska in 1973.
178. 565 P.2d 138 (Alaska 1977).
179. See id. at 148-49.
180. See id. at 152.
181. 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979).
182. See id. at 417-18.
183. See id. at 411-17; see also McCoy v. State, 419 P.2d 127, 140-41 (Alaska
1971).
184. See Daniel, 589 P.2d at 411.
185. Id. at 416.
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jected the state’s attempt to distinguish between locked and un-
locked containers.  He wrote that this attempted distinction
“ignores the common reality that some persons may not own lug-
gage with locks and that others expect that closed containers will
adequately conceal what they regard as private.”186
In Reeves v. State,187 writing for the majority, Justice Rabinow-
itz held unconstitutional a warrantless search of a package
(actually a rolled-up balloon) after it was removed from a prison
inmate during a pre-incarceration inventory of his property.188  The
case is analogous to Daniel in many ways; again, the initial seizure
of the object was legitimate but the court concluded that, because
no exigency justified a warrantless search, a warrant was required
before police could search inside the package.  Stressing the impor-
tance of a warrant, the Alaska Supreme Court held that, although
correctional officers routinely may conduct a warrantless search of
a new inmate in order to prevent the introduction of contraband
into the institution, they may not then search inside containers re-
moved from the inmate in the absence of a warrant.189  The holding
in Reeves rests solely on the Alaska Constitution, with the court
acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court had held that a law-
fully arrested individual retains no significant Fourth Amendment
interest in the privacy of his person.190
In a concurring opinion issued just a month after Reeves, Jus-
tice Rabinowitz reiterated yet again the high importance he placed
on a warrant or on a clearly defined exception to the warrant re-
quirement as the only ways to assure that individual privacy inter-
ests are properly protected against government intrusion.191  The
majority of the court in State v. Myers approved a late-night war-
rantless entry by police into the open back door of a theater, which
the officers had described as a “security check.”192  The majority
found the police conduct “reasonable,” even though it did not fit
within any of the previously recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement.193  Justice Rabinowitz was evidently uncomfortable
with the analysis based simply on “reasonableness.”  He concurred
in the result, but on the basis that the search in question fit within
the established “emergency aid” exception to the warrant re-
186. Id. at 417.
187. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979).
188. See id. at 736-38.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 734 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).
191. See State v. Myers, 601 P.2d 239, 245 (Alaska 1979) (Rabinowitz, J., con-
curring).
192. Id. at 241-45.
193. See id. at 244-45.
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quirement.194
The same themes about respecting privacy in the absence of a
warrant or a well-established warrant exception reappear in Justice
Rabinowitz’s dissent in Hinkel v. Anchorage.195  The majority ap-
proved the warrantless search of a woman’s purse, which the police
found on the seat of her car after she was removed from the car
and arrested for reckless driving.  The majority treated the search
as a search incident to an arrest, which, in order to locate any
weapon that might threaten officer safety, allows police to search
the personal property found on an arrestee, as well as the area
immediately around the person.196  The majority concluded that
there was no reason to distinguish a legitimate search of an arres-
tee’s clothing pockets and a search of a purse or pocketbook that
was not literally on the person but that would be used for generally
the same function as clothing pockets.197  Justice Rabinowitz found
the majority’s analysis unpersuasive.198  Once Hinkel was removed
from the car and away from her purse, Justice Rabinowitz saw ab-
solutely no basis for permitting a warrantless search of her purse.199
After 1980, with the creation of the Alaska Court of Appeals,
the Alaska Supreme Court heard relatively few criminal cases.
Justice Rabinowitz dissented in one of the only cases the supreme
court did hear that raised search and seizure issues involving the
privacy of the person and the home.  In Guidry v. State,200 two
plainclothes officers investigating an illegal moose kill drove onto
the suspect’s property.  They spoke with the owner and implied
through their comments that they were interested in purchasing his
property.  Because the owner-suspect could not answer all the offi-
cers’ questions, he invited the officers into his house to see if his
wife could provide additional information.  While inside the house,
the officers observed items that they believed were evidence of il-
legal moose hunting, and they used those observations to obtain a
search warrant.201  The majority approved the warrantless entry by
the fish and game investigators into the suspect’s home on the ba-
sis that the entry was consensual, even though consent was ob-
tained through a ruse.202  The majority also rejected claims that the
194. See id. at 245 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
195. 618 P.2d 1069 (Alaska 1980).
196. See id. at 1071.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 1073 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 1074-75 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
200. 671 P.2d 1277 (Alaska 1983).
201. See id. at 1279-80.
202. See id. at 1282.
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entry violated the suspect’s right of privacy.203
Justice Rabinowitz believed that the officers’ misrepresenta-
tion of who they were precluded a finding that the suspect had vol-
untarily consented to their entry into his home.  Since consent was
the only exception to the warrant requirement argued by the state,
in Justice Rabinowitz’s opinion, the entry was unconstitutional and
the evidence gained from the entry could not be relied on in issu-
ing the warrant.204  In light of this conclusion, Justice Rabinowitz
found it unnecessary to discuss the defendant’s privacy claim in de-
tail, but he commented that he concluded that the defendant’s pri-
vacy rights under the Alaska Constitution also were violated by the
officers’ entry into the home without valid consent.205
In 1986, in State v. Malkin,206 Justice Rabinowitz wrote the
majority opinion providing that, when a criminal defendant chal-
lenges a warrant as being based on false statements by the police to
the issuing magistrate, the government bears the burden of show-
ing that the false statements were not made recklessly or inten-
tionally.207  This position is more protective than the federal rule,
which places the burden of proof on the defendant.208  The court
believed that “[p]lacing such a burden on defendant would render
the test practically meaningless so as to have little deterrent ef-
fect.”209  In his opinion, Justice Rabinowitz characterized the deci-
sion the court made as one based on a balance of individual pri-
vacy rights against the societal interest in using reliable evidence of
criminal activity.210
In addition to the decisions Justice Rabinowitz himself wrote,
many decisions authored by his colleagues on the court drew heav-
ily on the principles expressed in Breese and Ravin to expand
criminal defendants’ privacy rights.  Brief mention should be made
203. See id. at 1282-83.
204. See id. at 1284 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
205. See id. at 1284-85 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
206. 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986).
207. See id. at 946.
208. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
209. Malkin, 722 P.2d at 948.
210. See id.  The Alaska Supreme Court’s decision is less protective of criminal
defendants’ rights than the opinion by the Alaska Court of Appeals, which held
that even negligent misstatements should not be considered in determining
whether a warrant should be upheld.  See State v. Malkin, 678 P.2d 1356, 1362
(Alaska Ct. App. 1984).  One of the five justices of the supreme court voted to
uphold the court of appeals’s approach.  See Malkin, 722 P.2d at 948-49
(Compton, J., dissenting).  While this article focuses on Justice Rabinowitz’s con-
tributions to protecting individual freedoms, it is important to recall that he was
not invariably the most liberal justice on the court, even on issues relating to pri-
vacy.
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of a few noteworthy cases, where the concerns for free speech and
privacy converged, and the Alaska Supreme Court reacted by pro-
viding protections to criminal defendants beyond those recognized
by the federal courts.
In State v. Glass,211 the supreme court adopted a rule prohib-
iting warrantless tape recording by police undercover agents.  The
court believed such a rule was necessary to preserve the freedom
of Alaskans to speak without fear that their words would be
broadcast to unintended listeners or preserved for posterity on
tape.  Justice Rabinowitz joined the majority in the original deci-
sion.  In the opinion on rehearing, when the majority opted to ap-
ply its decision prospectively only, Justice Rabinowitz dissented,
believing that the rights recognized in Glass should be applied in
all cases pending on direct review at the time of the original deci-
sion.212
In Bargas v. State,213 the court adopted a rule precluding ad-
mission of evidence that an individual refused to consent to a
search.  The court reasoned that refusal to agree to a search is a le-
gitimate exercise of one’s right to privacy and freedom from war-
rantless searches, and individuals should not be penalized for exer-
cising their rights.214
In Scott v. State,215 the court adopted a rule limiting pretrial
discovery from the defense, thereby protecting the privacy of a de-
fendant’s efforts to prepare a defense.  The court held that to re-
quire the defendant to disclose his potential witnesses violates his
right not to be compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence.216
In State v. Gonzalez,217 the supreme court adopted a rule re-
quiring the government to provide transactional immunity, not just
use and derivative use immunity, when individuals are compelled
to give testimony that is self-incriminating.  The supreme court
opinion does not specifically cite Breese and Ravin, but the opinion
211. 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978), opin. on rehg., 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979).
212. See Glass, 596 P.2d at 15-16 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
213. 489 P.2d 130 (Alaska 1971).
214. See id. at 132; see also Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1197 (Alaska 1983)
(Rabinowitz, J.) (extending Bargas to exclude evidence of defendant’s refusal to
agree to a search that would have been lawful even without defendant’s consent,
but not extending it to evidence of physical resistance to the search); Doisher v.
State, 658 P.2d 119 (Alaska 1983) (Rabinowitz, J.) (holding that defendant’s si-
lence was not admissible as an adoptive admission).
215. 519 P.2d 774, 785 (Alaska 1974).
216. In 1996, the Alaska legislature enacted a statute requiring more pretrial
discovery from defendants.  Relying on Scott, the Alaska Court of Appeals in-
validated the statute.  See State v. Summerville, 926 P.2d 465 (Alaska Ct. App.
1996), aff’d, 948 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
217. 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).
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by the court of appeals, which the supreme court affirmed, does.
The court of appeals specifically linked the immunity question to
the constitutional rights of privacy and free expression.218
In several important areas of criminal law, the Alaska Su-
preme Court has taken stances more protective of citizens’ privacy
than have courts of other jurisdictions.  Justice Rabinowitz wrote
many of the important decisions defining the limitations on war-
rantless searches.  Over the past three decades, the opinions he
authored contributed to the systematic development of an inde-
pendent theory of constitutional rights of criminal defendants.219
VIII.  CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court is accurately perceived nationwide
as an independent court protective of individual rights.  In many
areas of law, where the interests of government and the individual
diverge, the court has developed a jurisprudence requiring a
thoughtful balancing of competing interests.  In his years on the
court, Justice Rabinowitz played a central role in the development
of this case law.  When he wrote about hair length and marijuana
use in the early 1970s, he probably did not envision that these
opinions would prove so influential to the development of case law
on elections, child custody, adoptions, search and seizure, and im-
munity.  It was one of Justice Rabinowitz’s talents to draw on prin-
ciples expounded in one context when defining rights in a very dif-
ferent setting.  Based in no small part on Justice Rabinowitz’s
contributions, the Alaska Supreme Court has avoided the devel-
opment of rigid legal categories with unrelated modes of analysis
and moved instead toward similar balancing analyses in a wide va-
riety of constitutional law questions, in both civil and criminal
cases.  Decisions from the Alaska Supreme Court in the months
since Justice Rabinowitz’s retirement suggest that his influence will
continue to be felt for years to come.
218. See State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920, 933 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992) (“The
Alaska [c]onstitution’s unique concern with the rights to liberty and privacy, and
the Alaska Supreme Court’s vigilant enforcement of these rights, have a strong
bearing on the manner in which interpretation of Alaska’s privilege against self-
incrimination should be approached.”).
219. Justice Rabinowitz also authored the supreme court’s decision in State v.
Chaney, which established the court’s framework for review of criminal sentences.
See 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).  Chaney is significant in that it marks the begin-
ning of a theory of penal administration based entirely on the state constitution.
The philosophy and analytical approach on which the Chaney decision is based
ultimately was incorporated into statute by the Alaska legislature in 1978.  See
ALASKA STAT. §  12.55.005 (Michie 1996).
